It has become evident that a Ukrainian “victory” leading to the recapture of territories lost to Russia since 2014 is improbable. With the ongoing conflict in Ukraine showing little sign of abating and peace talks stalled almost completely, this scenario seems increasingly distant.
Peacekeeping is being promoted as an answer to this conflict.
.
Senior allied defense officials met in the U.K. on March 20 to discuss the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” for peacekeeping. Yet as Bence Németh of King’s College London has noted: “European leaders say they will only send troops if there is a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far
excluded signing a peace agreement that involves Western troops in Ukraine
.”
Peacekeeping can’t serve as a universal solution because its effectiveness relies on the presence of a pre-existing treaty or similar accord that sets up a peaceful situation to maintain. While the idea of deploying peacekeepers might foster trust and boost the chances of reaching a peace deal among conflicting sides, peacekeeping operations occur after such an agreement has been made. They do not have the power to enforce one.
Protecting NATO territory via deterrence through military presence in Europe along with NATO’s nuclear strategy is feasible and has a high chance of success.
current actions and planning
However, this fundamentally defensive strategy should not be mistaken for offensive—or counteroffensive, as some might call it—actions aimed at reclaiming Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia.
Unless NATO members are ready to use every aspect of their national power to enforce their will on Russia, considering its nuclear capabilities, the choice to end the conflict in Ukraine still lies mainly with Putin.
Should a peace accord emerge from the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, would NATO consider deploying a peacekeeping force? Such a force could potentially increase the likelihood of reaching a mutually agreeable resolution, thereby concluding negotiations with far fewer casualties than what might occur were the fighting to continue, even if it means slight adjustments along the battle lines.
Some allies have implied that NATO members
Would make up the majority of the proposed 30,000-soldier peacekeeping force.
Using the 1,165-member
International Forces and Monitors in the Sinai
as an example, a force this size to monitor compliance with a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement is theoretically plausible. Employing troops from 13 nations, it covers a boundary zone approximately 200 kilometers long and 40 kilometers in depth. Sources vary and the conflict is dynamic, but for purposes of comparison, the front between Russia and Ukraine is
between 1,000 and 1,600 kilometers
. Yet it is worth noting Egypt and Israel have no desire to change the status quo of their border following their 1979 peace treaty, so the Sinai observers need not enforce it.
Several key points must be considered concerning suggestions for a NATO peacekeeping force.
First, one should recognize that NATO is not a party to the conflict. Individual member states are providing assistance to Ukraine. NATO is not doing so as an organization, although it does provide a forum for members to coordinate national support. It would be astonishing if all 32 members agreed to collectively assume a NATO peacekeeping mission.
Second, it would be even more astonishing if Russia would agree. One of Putin’s excuses for invading Ukraine again has been to create a buffer zone between Russia and NATO members. Allowing NATO members to put a sizable number of military troops inside Ukraine would seem directly contrary to Putin’s image of Russian security. Why would he accept this condition when he apparently believes he now holds the “
winning hand
” and feels no urgency to reach a peace agreement?
Third, assuming a requirement for 30,000 peacekeeping troops and Putin’s acquiescence, where would these forces come from? It does not seem likely the allies could produce this number in the near-term in addition to those already committed to deterring Russia from within NATO member boundaries. (Note that peacekeeping forces must remain neutral. Lightly armed only for self-defense, they could not provide effective deterrence other than the possibility of serving as a “tripwire” to initiate the commitment of additional NATO forces.)
Although NATO might be the best organized and most experienced entity for leading a peacekeeping mission of this size and complexity, for the reasons described above, that is not a feasible solution. Approaches more likely to be acceptable to Putin could be a UN peacekeeping mission or an organization specifically created for the purpose of maintaining an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
China and/or India might be significant force contributors
.
Some NATO members apparently desire to be involved in a peacekeeping mission. Nonetheless, remaining outside of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine could have a positive aspect for NATO. Tactically and strategically, it may be wiser to employ additional troops to beef up the defense of the NATO members near to Russia instead of using them to perform peacekeeping within Ukraine.
Christopher M. Schnaubelt, PhD, is a former dean of the NATO Defense College. A retired U.S. Army officer, he served on deployments to Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan and participated in three multinational peacekeeping exercises in Ukraine.
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